We define the Fisherian Golden Rule measure of bond market inflation expectations as the difference between bond rates and trend real GDP growth rates. The concept is based on the Fisherian theory that an increase in longer-term inflation expectations would be reflected in longer-term interest rates and the Golden Rule theory that in longer-term equilibrium the real rates of interest would equal the growth rate of real output. We compare the bond market inflation experiences of 13 advanced countries for the 1881-1913 gold standard era with the experience of the recent 1962 -1995 period. The difference between average longer-term bond rates and average real GDP growth rates reflected the widespread expectation of low inflation during 1881-1913 in all of the industrial countries. Although real GDP growth was somewhat higher on average during 1962-65 than 1881-1913, bond rate averages were considerably higher, roughly comparable with the higher observed inflation rates. Long-term bond rates fell across the spectrum of the industrial countries in the 1980s and 1990s and bond market expectations for low inflation were substantially, but not fully regained for the industrial countries as a group.
INTRODUCTION
Inflation has been low in recent years. Yet bond markets in industrial countries have not fully reflected it. Certainly not in the United States where government bond rates in 2001 were higher than they ever were before the mid 1960s. Chart 1 reveals the systematic association between government bond rates and inflation in U.S. data from 1962 through 1999. Inflation rose in three spurts in the1960s and 1970s and then fell sharply in the 1980s. The gap between the bond rate and, not annual inflation, but average inflation over the previous ten years roughly approximates the U.S. real GDP growth trend which is also plotted. It is this simple association in the data that is explored in the present paper for the United States and other highly industrialized countries, and for both recent decades and a period of comparable length before World War I. Although individual country data are the essential elements of the analysis, our focus is on the average patterns across these major industrial countries with respect to inflation, longer-term interest rates, real growth rates, and our calculations of the inflationary expectations that are implicit in bond rates.
The two periods studied are the thirty-three years before World War I, 1881 War I, -1913 , and the thirty-three years beginning with the take off of inflation in the1960s, 1963-1995. In the first period near zero inflation was generally observed. It was the hey-day of a fixed exchange rate international monetary system under the gold standard. Year-to-year price level changes were highly volatile, but bond rates were remarkably stable. In the second period, pressures on the U.S. dollar developed leading to the demise of the post-World War II Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. It was a period when fiat monetary standards were established with no brake on inflation in a country except the performance of its central bank In the 1960s and 1970s, the inflation trend turned up substantially across the world, but then turned down after the early 1980s.
Although bond rates followed these inflation trends up and down, in neither period did the bond market foresee impending changes in inflation trends. The surge in inflation in World War I was not incorporated in bond rates before the war. The acceleration in inflation in the 1970s was not sufficiently incorporated in bond rates in the 1960s and early 1970s. Neither was the deceleration of inflation that occurred subsequently. Thus, inflation expectations imbedded 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
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Annual CPI Inflation 10-Year Average CPI Inflation Real GDP Growth Rate Average in bond rates appear to have adapted reasonably well to past inflation, but, as a consequence, bond market inflation expectations have systematically underestimated rising inflation trends and overestimated falling inflation trends. The paper concludes that central banks in the 1990s had much less credibility in bond markets to keep inflation low than had existed in the mid 1960s at the advent of the subsequent long cycle of inflation and disinflation. And none had the kind of credibility to keep price levels stable in the long run that existed before World War I.
BOND MARKET INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Theoretically, bond rates would increase with an increase in either expected inflation or expected real output growth -a proxy for the real rate of interest. Hence, given other factors, the difference between bond rates and trend real GDP growth rates --such as was illustrated in
Chart 1 --is a measure of bond market inflation expectations. The concept is based on the Fisherian theory that an increase in longer-term inflation expectations would be fully reflected in longer-term interest rates 2 . It is also based on the Golden Rule theory that in a longer-term equilibrium, the real rate of interest would equal the rate of real output growth 3 . According to that theory expected future real returns on investments would be a function of expected future real output growth which would increase the demand for credit to finance investment and raise longer-term interest rates.
Although there are a variety of tax, regulation, and risk factors that also influence bond rates, this paper focuses on the simple Fisherian-Golden Rule hypothesis that nominal 2 "The fact that interest expressed in money is high, say 15 per cent, might conceivably indicate merely that general prices are expected to rise (i.e., money depreciate) at the rate of 10 per cent, and that the rate of interest expressed in terms of goods is not high, but only about 5 per cent." Irving Fisher The Theory of Interest, Reprints of Economic Classics, Augustus M. Kelly, 1961, pp. 41-42. 3 This is a common assumption in both theoretical and empirical studies. In formulating his "Taylor Rule", John Taylor (1993) , for example, set the equilibrium short-term interest rate at the trend growth in real income because this value is approximately equal to potential growth, i.e. compatible with a long-term equilibrium growth path.
government bond rates would vary directly with both expected real output growth and expected inflation over the maturity of the bonds.
THE VARIABLES, COUNTRIES, AND PERIODS
The data we focus on include consumer price inflation, ten-year government bond rates, and real GDP growth. We have data for thirteen major industrial countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States which make up the G10, plus Belgium, Denmark, and Norway. Annual data are available with few exceptions. The missing data are bond rates for Japan and real GDP for Belgium during 1881-1913, and inflation for Belgium during 1915-1919, a period for which their ten-year bond rates through 1913 incorporated an implicit inflation expectation.
The periods 1881-1913 and 1963-1995 The following tables and charts present the annual statistics on which the analysis is based: CPI inflation, ten-year government bond rates, real GDP growth, and the difference between bond rates and real GDP growth rate trends which is our measure of bond market inflation expectations over the maturity of the bonds. Chart 4 plots the cross-country averages of CPI inflation for the two periods. During 1881-1913 the inflation average rose and fell around zero early in the period but then increased to about 2 percent at the end of the period. During 1963-1995 the inflation average accelerated from about 4 percent early in the period to a peak of 12 percent in the mid-1970s but then cycled down to about 2 percent at the end of the period. Table 3 shows that annual changes in inflation rates were comparably variable in the earlier as in the recent period. That inflation rates were higher in 1913 than 1881 is manifested in a positive average change in inflation rates in that period. In the recent period, inflation rates in 1995 were also slightly higher on average than in 1963, but, as noted, average inflation over the entire period was enormously higher. The comparative stability in bond rates is also shown in Table 6 presents means and standard deviations of real GDP growth in twelve industrial countries during 1881-1913 and in the entire thirteen during 1963-1995. The data for Japanese real GDP growth were not available before 1886. We also lack real GDP data for Belgium before World War I.. The table shows that the United States and Canada had the fastest growth in the period before World War I. They also experienced the greatest slowing in real growth in the recent period relative to the earlier period. Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden also experienced slower growth in the recent period than in the pre World War I period. France, Norway, and particularly Japan, which had had only mediocre real growth in the earlier period for which we have data, experienced substantially higher growth in the recent period. Among the eleven industrialized economies for which we had real GDP data for both periods, only Canada and Germany had above average growth rates during both periods. Charts 7 and 8 show annual cross-country averages of real GDP growth and the individual country growth rates for 1881-1913 and 1963-1995 . Chart 9 plots the cross-country annual averages and the overall 33 year averages of real GDP growth for each period. The higher year-to-year volatility in real growth both individual country and cross-country observations in the earlier period is apparent in the charts. 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 In our calculations of Fisher-Golden Rule bond market inflation expectations, average real growth rates represent prospective long-run investment opportunities. The cross-country average real GDP growth was 0.55 percentage point higher in the recent period than in the earlier period. Thus, within our framework, the increase in real growth trends would be reflected in a comparable increase in real interest rates. In fact, nominal interest rates on average were 4.98
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percentage points higher in the recent than in the earlier period. We attribute the 4.43 percentage point discrepancy over 0.55 percentage points to an increase in bond market inflation expectations.
Inflation Credibility
The very low and stable long-term interest rate environment in major industrial countries during the years before World War I is a classic example of market credibility for long run price level stability. As noted, inflation was highly volatile from year to year, and the price level 
1881-1913
actually drifted up a little over the period in almost every industrial country. Yet, bond markets had sufficient faith that domestic currencies would hold their purchasing power in the long run that ten-year government bond rates did not generally change much in response to short-term movements in the price level.
By contrast, although some fared much worse than others, none of the central banks in major industrial countries kept its credibility to keep inflation low let alone price level stability in the recent period. Already in 1963, inflation among industrial countries averaged nearly 4 percent a year and long-term bond rates although averaging only 5 percent would soon rise sharply. Credibility to keep inflation low was being lost.
In the recent period the Swiss National Bank was the most successful in maintaining its credibility in bond markets to keep inflation low. In 1963 it had by far the lowest long-term interest rates among the thirteen industrial countries. When inflation accelerated worldwide during the 1970s, its long term bond rates rose less than those in other countries. In 1995 its longer-term bond rates were lower than long rates in every other country except Japan, which was in the midst of extended economic slow down and deflation. Although Germany also had comparatively low long-term bond rates during 1963-1995, it had higher rates than Switzerland, and its rates rose relative to those in other countries in the mid 1990s with the reunification of East and West Germany. Italy and the United Kingdom had the worst record in terms of not only inflation but also bond rate peaks. Even after inflation fell, their bond rates remained comparatively high relative to their inflation rates in 1995.
Charts 8, 9, and 10 compare bond rates, real GDP growth trends, and inflation in the 
BOND MARKET INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
In a world of relatively free capital movements across national boundaries, long-term real interest rates in particular countries would reflect world investment and saving propensities, and nominal rates would reflect domestic inflationary prospects 4 . Countries with superior investment and real growth prospects would induce capital imports from the rest of the world. Their current account and trade balance deficits would reflect the capital inflow from nations that were saving more than they were investing domestically. Such a "World Growth Model" is the one used to generate the bond market inflation expectations that are reported in this paper 5 . In this approach the overall cross-country average real GDP growth rate for each of the periods is subtracted from individual country annual bond rates to calculate each country's bond market inflation expectations over the maturity of the bonds.
Tables 7 and 8 present cross-country averages of inflation ten years back and ten years ahead in columns 2 and 3. Column 4 is our calculated bond market expectations for average inflation over the ten-year maturity of the bonds. As noted, the expectation of inflation ten years ahead is calculated by subtracting the overall cross-country average real growth rate from each country's annual bond rate. Columns 5 and 6 record the expectations deviations from inflation over the ten-year maturity of the bonds and over the previous ten years. 6 Although there are many other factors that affect inflation expectations, bond market inflation expectations as measured averaged about one percentage point during 1880-1913 when longer-term inflation averaged close to zero. One can speculate about the source of this discrepancy. It might reflect that measured real output growth was systematically underestimated. It might reflect a default risk premium in an environment where governments could default on debt in a gold standard world. It might reflect that bond markets, even in an age when inflation was low and widely expected to stay low, had a foreboding that inflation might burst forth again as in many historical episodes. For whatever reason, average bond rates were about a percentage point higher than real GDP growth rates before World War I. During 1962-1995, bond market inflation expectations as measured averaged close to lagged actual inflation.
Thus, the Fisherian-Golden Rule measure of bond market inflationary expectations appears to have captured a fundamental market relationship between bond rates, real GDP growth rates, and inflation that holds up quite well on average over thirty-three year periods across vastly different eras in terms of monetary regimes, technological and cultural developments, etc. Nevertheless, as Tables 7 and 8 show, these bond market inflation expectations systematically failed to perceive major changes in inflation trends. The information in Tables 7 and 8 One of the benefits to governments that have established credibility to keep inflation low is that, if they choose, they can exploit bond holders by creating an inflation that reduces the real value of outstanding bonds. Credibility allows the inflation tax to generate large revenues because real balances do not decline as much as they would if credibility were low. 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 Chart 13 and 14 show cross-country average and individual country 10-year-ahead inflation expectations errors. The charts show that there was more variation across countries in bond market inflation forecast errors in the second period than the first period.. In both periods, there was considerable similarity in the errors across countries. That seems a reasonable expectation in the fixed exchange regime in the first period. One might have expected individual countries to go their own way with respect to inflation in a flexible exchange rate environment which existed through much of the recent period. In fact, there were wide differences between the inflation rates and bond market inflation expectations of future inflation across the spectrum of the thirteen industrialize countries included in our study. Nevertheless, the pattern of bond markets systematically expecting inflation to be what it had been is reflected in both periods and in every nation. Each systematically missed the surge of inflation in World War I, the acceleration of inflation in the 1970s, and the deceleration of inflation in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Monetary Growth
Although the emphasis of this paper is not directly on the relationship between monetary growth and inflation 9 , Table 10 shows that M2 growth was lower in every country and on average during the low inflation pre World War I period than during the high inflation recent period. M2 growth increased 4.93 percentage point from the first to the second period which is comparable with the 5.17 percentage point increase in inflation between the two periods. This observation is consistent with the Quantity Theory concept that inflation is fundamentally a monetary phenomenon. 
Conclusion
The Fisherian-Golden Rule concept of bond market inflationary expectations has provided a consistent framework for interpreting the historical data discussed in this paper. The difference between average longer-term bond rates and average real GDP growth rates reflected the widespread expectation of low inflation during 1881-1913 in all of the industrial countries included in our study. Bond rates were closely clustered with the UK anchoring the international gold standard monetary system with the lowest bond rates throughout that period. Ten-yearahead bond market inflation expectations fit the actual experience well through 1903, but then understandably failed to foresee the surge of inflation that occurred with the advent of World War I ten years hence.
Although real GDP growth was somewhat higher on average during 1962-1995 than 1881-1913, bond rate averages were considerably higher, roughly comparable with the higher inflation and monetary growth rates that were observed. The recent period was one when fixed exchange rates in terms of the U.S. dollar under Bretton Woods were abandoned in the 1970s under inflationary pressures attributable to accelerating monetary growth in the United States and other industrial countries. The narrow band of longer-term interest rates that existed among the industrial countries in the mid-1960s widened significantly in the 1970s and early 1980s as did inflation patterns. Led by Japan, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland, monetary growth, inflation, and long-term bond rates fell across the spectrum of the industrial countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Bond market expectations for low inflation were substantially, but not fully, regained by the industrial countries as a group.
Financial journalists have repeatedly cited the low longer-term interest rates in recent years as at historically low levels which is not true. Taking a much broader sweep of history, long-term interest rates in every industrial country today -except Japan -are higher now than they were in the pre World War I period. Furthermore, in most industrial countries and, in particular the United States, long-term interest rates are higher today than they were in the 1960s before the long inflation-disinflation cycle of the past 40 years got underway. That observation might reflect higher real growth prospects but on the basis of the historical record discussed in this paper, we suspect it reflects that bond markets have not fully adapted to the low inflation of recent years. Bond markets have forecast inflation accurately only when it has not changed much which is a reason for central banks to use their powers to keep inflation low and in principle eliminate it.
